

K Subramanian is considered as the doyen of strategic thinking in India was because his grand narratives were appealing and at least one of them worked very well in India Pakistan War of 1971. Unfortunately, the tribe of strategic thinkers with similar grand narratives has not proliferated adequately. Consequently, we are not sure about possible grand narratives that would supplement public policy initiatives on China or Pakistan. Third, the armed forces need continued strategic exposure as part of professional military education PME, particularly at the commanding officers level and above.

However, we do not have a rich academic back grounding of military literature in India. We also do not have the likes of proclaimed academic strategic experts in west like Colin S Gray, John Lewis Gaddis and Lawrence Freedman. Yet, in going back to archival times for our current national security challenges, we suffer from at least three disadvantages. First, we tend to overpitch the importance of ancient scriptures even if they are largely irrelevant in contemporary times. Warfare during ancient times was pedestrian and conducted with primitive weapons. Philosophical propositions by strategic thinkers during.

Those days largely catered to their times. Their strategic thought might make pleasant academic readings but do not cater to contemporary battlefield requirements where warfare has changed in every possible manner. In imposing grand historical narratives over armed forces officers, we would perhaps make historians out of them instead of good military leaders. Second, we remain trapped in the binary of their strategic thought vest our strategic thought. For long, we were forced to study the strategic thoughts of Sun Tusk, Clausewitz and Thucydides. Promotion of Kautilya as the centerpiece of Indian strategic thought is a welcome riposte to allegations that India does not have a strategic culture. But there are internal contradictions and divisions emerging within the Indian.